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Characterizing secret communication over noisy quantum channels is an interesting problem from
both a practical and theoretical perspective. Suppose Alice and Bob wish to communicate secret
information so that an eavesdropper Eve will not suspect any type of encoded communication
between the two. Classical or quantum cryptography will not suffice since it is always clear secret
communication is taking place. Therefore Alice and Bob must execute what is known as a quantum
steganographic protocol. Assuming Eve only has partial knowledge of the channel connecting Alice
and Bob, we show that for the bit-flip and depolarizing channels Alice can use Eve’s lack of knowledge
of the channel parameter to encode quantum information steganographically. We give an explicit
encoding procedure and calculate the rate at which Alice and Bob can communicate secretly. We also
show that our encoding is optimal for nondegenerate quantum codes. We calculate the rate at which
secret key must be consumed. Finally, we discuss the possibility of steganographic communication
over more general quantum channels, and conjecture a general formula for the steganographic rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose Alice and Bob are the respective leaders of
two countries and they wish to communicate highly clas-
sified information with each other over a public channel.
They do not want other countries to know they are com-
muncating secret information, perhaps because they have
a history of shady international political relations. Sim-
ple cryptography would not be good enough here bea-
cause it would alert a potential eavesdropper (Eve) that
secret communication is taking place, even if she cannot
read it. Therefore, if Alice and Bob wish to keep their
conversations secret, they must employ a steganographic
protocol.
Both cryptography and steganography are interesting
and well-developed subjects, the studies of which date
back millenia [1, 2]. In cryptography, a secret message
is encrypted using a shared secret key between Alice and
Bob, and Alice sends the resulting ciphertext across a
channel to be decoded. Should Eve observe this cipher-
text, she would not be able to decode it without the secret
key. However, she would undoubtedly become suspicious
if she weren’t already, due to Alice sending encrypted
messages to Bob.
Steganography solves this problem of secrecy. Al-
though cryptography allows for secure communication,
in this paper we are interested in secret communica-
tion. In steganography, a secret message is hidden into
a larger covertext, which appears to Eve as an innocu-
ous message. This seeming innocuousness of the message
is what makes the protocol secret. The hidden message
may also be encrypted itself to make the protocol not
only secret but secure, so that even if Eve were tipped
off to there being secret communication between Alice
and Bob, she would not be able to decode the hidden
message. For example, digital audio, video, and pictures
are increasingly furnished with distinguishing but imper-
ceptible marks, which may contain a hidden copyright
notice or encrypted serial number [3].
Ever since Shor’s remarkable discovery that a quan-
tum computer could solve the prime factorization prob-
lem efficiently, hence cracking one of the internet’s most
common encryption schemes [4], interest in quantum
cryptography has been intense. Quantum steganogra-
phy is of more recent development [5–7]. The protocol
we will be considering is to encode quantum informa-
tion steganographically as error syndromes of a quan-
tum error-correcting code. This was detailed extensively
by Shaw and Brun [8, 9], where it was shown that such
schemes can hide both quantum and classical informa-
tion, with a quantitative measure of secrecy, even in the
presence of a noisy physical channel.
A more precise analysis of this quantum stegano-
graphic protocol over noiseless channels was done by the
present authors in terms of achievability and converse
proofs [10]. In this work, we treated the case where Eve
believes the channel connecting Alice and Bob to be some
noisy quantum channel, but the actual physical channel
is noiseless, and we gave optimal rates of steganographic
communication.
A related field is known as covert quantum commu-
nication [11–15]. In covert communications, it is often
assumed that the channel between Alice and Bob is a
noisy optical channel, which is modelled by a beamsplit-
ter with some transmissivity parameter that character-
izes how many photons are lost to Eve. Covert quantum
communication can be seen as a special case of quan-
tum steganography over noisy quantum channels in the
case where the eavesdropper has exact knowledge of the
channel, and where Eve assumes the channel is idle (so
only noise is being transmitted). Similarily, quantum
steganography is a type of covert quantum communica-
tion where Eve knows about the covertext communica-
tion but not the hidden stegotext, and where Eve may not
have perfect knowledge of the channel. In covert quan-
tum communication, it has been shown that in general
one can secretly communicate an amount of classical in-
formation which scales like the square root of the number
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2of channel uses.
The goal of this paper is to extend the previous work
on quantum steganography over noiseless channels in [10]
to the scenario where the channel Alice and Bob share
is noisy. We assume that Eve believes the channel to be
noisier than it is, which allows Alice and Bob to com-
municate at a linear rate in the number of channel uses.
This assumption is not unreasonable, especially when Al-
ice and Bob have been systemetically deceiving Eve by
adding extra noise. We also assume that Alice and Bob
are using an error-correcting code powerful enough to
correct errors induced by the channel Eve believes to be
connecting them, or else she would become suspicious.
Eve would also become suspicious if the pattern of er-
rors Alice uses to encode her secret information does not
match the typical errors induced by the channel that Eve
expects.
In Section II we formalize our notion of quantum
steganography where secret messages are hidden in the
syndromes of an error-correcting code. We outline a spe-
cific steganographic encoding where Alice is able to emu-
late a bit flip or depolarizing channel Np+δp (the channel
Eve believes to be connecting them) on her encoded se-
cret message and covertext, where the actual physical
channel is Np. We also calculate the amount of key con-
sumed in our protocol. In Section III we prove upper
bounds on the amount of steganographic communication
possible over these channels, and show that these bounds
are asymptotically equal to the rates achieved in the pre-
vious section. Finally, in Section IV we summarize our
results, and discuss quantum steganography for general
quantum channels, conjecturing a capacity formula for
general quantum steganographic communication.
II. ACHIEVABILITY
A. Bit Flip Channel
Suppose that Alice wishes to communicate stegano-
graphically to Bob by secretly sending him a message m
drawn from a set of possible messages M, assumed to
all be equally likely. Alice and Bob can communicate
via a quantum channel, but the eavesdropper Eve can
monitor their communications over this channel if she
chooses. They cannot communicate clasically without
Eve intercepting their communications, but before the
protocol began they exchanged a secret key, in the form
of an arbitrarily long string of random bits, unknown to
Eve. We assume that Eve believes the quantum channel
shared between Alice and Bob to be a bit flip channel
with error rate p+ δp, i.e.,
NBFp+δp(ρ) = (1− (p+ δp))ρ+ (p+ δp)XρX. (1)
However, the actual physical channel between Alice and
Bob is NBFp . First, Alice encodes an innocent state, i.e.
the covertext ρc, into a nondegenerate quantum error-
correcting code (QECC) on N qubits. This code should
be able to correct typical errors induced by the channel
(NBFp+δp)⊗N . Next, depending on the secret key k ∈ K
and the message m ∈M that she would like to send, she
applies the error
EN (k,m) = E1(k,m)⊗ ...⊗ EN (k,m) (2)
to her state. This produces the codeword corresponding
to the message m. If her message to Bob is a quan-
tum state, she can prepare the system in a superposi-
tion of these codewords. These codewords are generated
by applying errors drawn randomly from the channel
(NBFq )⊗N , using the shared secret key k as the source
of randomness. That is, the errors X or I on each qubit
are drawn from the product distribution pEN (e
N ), where
pE(e) is given by
pE(X) = q,
pE(I) = 1− q, (3)
where q = δp/(1− 2p). Since the set of errors is selected
using the shared secret key k, Bob knows which codeword
corresponds to each message m.
The errors given by Eq. (2) are typical errors associ-
ated with the channel (NBFq )⊗N [16, 17]. By the asymp-
totic equipartition theorem [18], for large enough N , it is
highly likely that each of these codewords that Alice gen-
erates is a typical sequence with a sample entropy close to
H(E) = −(1−q) log(1−q)−q log q = h(q). Furthermore,
it follows from a simple calculation that Np◦Nq = Np+δp
if we set q = δp/(1 − 2p). This will become important
later when we discuss the secrecy of this protocol.
Alice then sends her state through the channel
(NBFp )⊗N . We are now essentially in the scenario of
classical random coding over a classical bit-flip channel
with parameter p. By the asymptotic equipartition the-
orem for conditionally typical sequences [18], for each
input sequence (i.e., error EN (k,m) applied to the en-
coded covertext) there is a corresponding conditionally
typical set of errors {FN (k,m)} which has the follow-
ing properties: its total probability is close to 1, its size
is ≈ 2nH(F |E), and the probability of each conditionally
typical error given knowledge of the input error EN (k,m)
is ≈ 2−nH(F |E).
With high probability, the error FN Bob observes will
be a typical error of the channel (NBFp+δp)⊗N . We know
from Shannon’s noisy channel coding theorem that if Al-
ice and Bob set the number of messages |M| = 2NR such
that
2NR ≈ 2
NH(F )
2NH(F |E)
= 2N(H(F )−H(F |E)), (4)
then Bob is able to decode correctly with high probability
[18–20] which error EN (k,m) was applied by Alice, as
long as the code is nondegenerate. For our protocol, it is
straightforward to calculate that H(F ) = h(p+q−2pq) =
h(p+δp) for q = δp/(1−2p), and H(F |E) = h(p). Hence
Alice can communicate
M = log |M| ≈ N(h(p+ δp)− h(p)) (5)
3bits of information to Bob steganographically.
Moreover, this protocol does not arouse suspicion from
Eve. We say that this protocol is secret, because the state
passing through the channel is to good approximation the
state Eve would expect to see. To see this, note that∑
k∈K
∑
m∈M
pk(NBFp )⊗N (EN (k,m)V ρcV †EN (k,m))
= (NBFp )⊗N (
∑
k∈K
∑
m∈M
pkE
N (k,m)V ρcV
†EN (k,m))
≈ (NBFp ◦ NBFδp/(1−2p))⊗N (V ρcV †)
= (NBFp+δp)⊗N (V ρcV †), (6)
where V is the isometry corresponding to the QECC Al-
ice and Bob are using. The first equality follows from lin-
earity of quantum operations. The approximate equality
follows from the fact that when we average the trans-
mitted codeword over the key and all possible messages,
we are applying all the typical errors of the channel
(NBFq )⊗N with their correct probabilities, and hence to
good approximation [16, 17] we are simply applying the
full channel. The final equality follows from calculat-
ing the composition of these quantum operations. This
is exactly the state Eve expects to observe, hence our
steganographic protocol is secret to an arbitrarily good
approximation.
As described above, this protocol allows Alice to trans-
mit a classical message m secretly to Bob. But in fact,
by making this protocol coherent Alice can equally well
transmit a quantum state—that is, a superposition of
possible messages m. So we see that this protocol can
transmit either classical or quantum information at the
same rate h(p+δp)−h(p). The one significant difference
between these two cases is that if Eve actually carries out
a measurement of the error on the transmitted state, this
would destroy the superpositions of a quantum message,
but not affect the ability to transmit classical messages.
So this protocol works for secret quantum communication
if it is assumed that Eve only sometimes checks the code
blocks transmitted from Alice to Bob. As we did in the
case of steganographic communication over a noiseless
channel [10], we can show this by considering a proto-
col in which Alice sends a subsystem M to Bob which is
maximally entangled with a reference subsystem R (see
Figure 1).
B. Depolarizing Channel
Suppose that Eve believes the quantum channel shared
between Alice and Bob is a depolarizing channel with
error rate p+ δp, i.e.,
NDCp+δp(ρ) = (1− (p+ δp))ρ
+
p+ δp
3
(XρX + Y ρY + ZρZ), (7)
where the actual physical channel between Alice and Bob
is NDCp . The protocol for Alice and Bob to communi-
cate steganographically in this scenario is nearly identi-
cal to the protocol described in the previous subsection.
First, Alice encodes an innocent state, i.e,. the covertext
ρc, into a nondegenerate quantum error-correcting code
(QECC) on N qubits. This code should be able to cor-
rect typical errors induced by the channel (NDCp+δp)⊗N .
Next, depending on the secret key k ∈ K and the mes-
sage m ∈M that she would like to send, she applies the
error
GN (k,m) = G1(k,m)⊗ ...⊗GN (k,m) (8)
to her state. This produces the codeword corresponding
to the message m. If her message to Bob is a quan-
tum state, she can prepare the system in a superposi-
tion of these codewords. These codewords are generated
by applying errors drawn randomly from the channel
(NDCq )⊗N , using the shared secret key k as the source
of randomness. That is, the errors X, Y , Z or I on each
qubit are drawn from the product distribution pGN (g
N ),
where pG(g) is given by
pG(X) = pG(Y ) = pG(Z) = q/3,
pG(I) = 1− q, (9)
and q = δp/(1 − 4p/3). Since the errors are selected
using the shared secret key k, Bob knows what codeword
corresponds to each message m.
The errors given by Eq. (8) are typical errors associ-
ated with the channel (NDCq )⊗N [16, 17]. By the asymp-
totic equipartition theorem [18], for large enough N , it is
highly likely that each of these codewords that Alice gen-
erates is a typical sequence with a sample entropy close
to H(G) = −(1− q) log(1− q)− q log(q/3) ≡ s(q), where
s(q) is the classical Shannon entropy of the depolarizing
channel on one qubit with error parameter q in the Pauli
representation. Furthermore, it follows from a simple cal-
culation thatNp◦Nq = Np+δp if we set q = δp/(1−4p/3),
which is important for secrecy as discussed in the previ-
ous subsection.
Alice then sends her state through the channel
(NDCp )⊗N . Following the same random coding argument
described for the bit-flip channel, with high probabil-
ity, the error JN Bob observes will be a typical error
of the channel (NDCp+δp)⊗N . We know from Shannon’s
noisy channel coding theorem that if Alice and Bob set
the number of messages |M| = 2NR such that
2NR ≈ 2
NH(J)
2NH(J|G)
= 2N(H(J)−H(J|G)), (10)
then Bob is able to decode correctly with high probability
[18–20] which error GN (k,m) was applied by Alice, as
long as the code is nondegenerate. For our protocol, it
is straightforward to calculate that H(J) = s(p + q −
4qp/3) = s(p+ δp) for q = δp/(1− 4p/3), and H(J |G) =
s(p). Hence Alice can communicate
M = log |M| ≈ N(s(p+ δp)− s(p)) (11)
4classical or quantum bits of information to Bob stegano-
graphically. The proof of secrecy of this protocol is nearly
identical to the one given in Eq. (6).
Note that the assumption of a nondegenerate code is
quite natural in the case of the bit-flip channel, which
is essentially classical; but not as much so for the depo-
larizing channel, where the errors do not commute. We
believe that this general procedure for encoding will work
for degenerate codes as well, but the achievable rate may
be lower, and will require an analysis specific to the code
in question. We will return to this point at the end of
the paper, where we conjecture a general formula for the
steganographic rate of a quantum channel using general
quantum codes.
C. Secret key consumption
Here we analyze how much secret key is used by the
encodings outlined above. The details of the encoding—
that is, how each message m is mapped to a codeword for
a particular key element k—we assume have been decided
between Alice and Bob ahead of time. Therefore secret
key is required to pick the subsets of errors used in the
encoding, but it is not needed otherwise.
Before the protocol begins, Alice and Bob divide the
set of typical errors of the channel (NBFδp/(1−2p))⊗N into
n nonoverlapping subsets of size |M| = 2N(h(p+δp)−h(p))
each, where
n =
2Nh(δp/(1−2p))
2N(h(p+δp)−h(p))
. (12)
For each transmitted block, Alice and Bob must ran-
domly choose one of these n subsets to encode her mes-
sages. This requires a number of bits K of secret key,
K = log2 n = N(h(δp/(1−2p))−h(p+δp)+h(p)), (13)
which is positive for p + δp < 0.5. Therefore the key
consumption scales linearly with N . Notice in the limit
where the physical channel is noiseless i.e., p = 0, we
have that K = 0, which agrees with our result in [10]
where it was shown that only a sublinear amount of key
is needed for encoding across noiseless channels.
As discussed in [10], using this amount K of shared
secret is key is sufficient to make the steganographic pro-
tocol secret, but not necessarily secure. That is, Eve
should not become suspicious if she observes the state
passing through the channel. However, if for some rea-
son she knew a message was being sent, she would be able
to deduce significant information about the message.
This can be prevented by first encrypting the message
before doing the steganographic encoding. If we wish
to make the protocol both secret and secure, encryption
would require M bits of secret key in the case of an M -
bit classical message (using a one-time pad), or 2M bits
of secret key in the case of an M -qubit quantum message
(by twirling). Thus the rate of key consumption would
FIG. 1. The information processing task we consider, of Alice
sending M stego qubits to Bob over a quantum channel Np
(which is either the quantum bit flip channel or depolarizing
channel), which Eve believes to be noisier. Eve’s ignorance of
the channel is characerized by the parameter δp. Dependent
on the secret key k, Alice encodes her message subsystem M
and an innocent covertext ρc into a suitable quantum error-
correcting code in such a way that once passed through the
physical channel, it looks as though typical errors of the chan-
nel Np+δp have been applied. Bob then decodes the message
and covertext using his copy of the shared secret key k. Al-
ice’s message is entangled with a reference system R. The
ability to transmit entanglement can be used to bound the
ability to do general quantum communication.
be increased by R (classical) or 2R (quantum, where R
is the steganographic rate).
III. SECRECY, RELIABILITY, AND BOUNDS
A. The information processing task
Now we wish to put a bound on the amount of infor-
mation that can be sent with the steganographic scenario
outlined above. Recall that Alice is using Eve’s ignorance
of the actual noise rate of the physical channel to hide
her message. We will consider the quantum information
processing task known as entanglement transmission (vi-
sualized in Figure 1) in this section. The maximum rate
of entanglement transmission is clearly an upper bound
on the maximum rate of quantum communication and so
we will use this to derive a bound on the steganographic
transmission rate. Alice prepares a secret message of
M = log2 |A1| qubits along with an innocent covertext
ρc. Her secret message qubits are maximally entangled
with a reference system R. Her covertext will be encoded
into the N -qubit quantum error-correcting code. There-
fore her encoded state, which is dependent on the secret
key element k, can be written as:
ωk,A′nR ≡ Ek,A1C→A′n(ρc ⊗ ΦA1R). (14)
5The dependence of the encoding on the secret key cor-
responds to choosing among the different sets of typical
errors of the channel Nq in the protocols from the previ-
ous section. To someone (like Eve) who does not know
the secret key k, the state is effectively∑
k
pkN⊗Np (ωk,A′nR) = N⊗Np (ωA′nR), (15)
where we have used linearity of quantum operations and
ωA′nR ≡
∑
k pkωk,A′nR is the state averaged over all pos-
sible values of the secret key k with probabilities pk. (We
can choose this probability to be uniform for simplicity,
if we so desire.)
What is a good way to guarentee secrecy from Eve?
We propose the following secrecy condition:
1
2
||N⊗Np (TrR[ωA′nR])−N⊗Np+δp(V ρcV †)|| ≤ δ, (16)
where Np+δp is what Eve believes the physical channel
to be, V is an isometry representing the encoding of the
covertext into a suitably chosen codeword (one which can
correct typical errors induced by the channel Np+δp) and
δ > 0 is some small parameter. This condition means
that if Eve observes the quantum state, it will be effec-
tively indistinguishable from an encoded covertext being
sent through the noisy quantum channel Np+δp.
It is also important to discuss the requirement of recov-
erability. When Bob receives the state, he applies his de-
coder Dk,A′n→B1C to obtain the original state ρc⊗ΦB1R.
The recoverability condition can be written as follows:
1
2
||Dk,A′n→B1C(N⊗Np ⊗ IR(ωk,A′nR))− ρc ⊗ ΦB1R||1 ≤ 
(17)
for all k, where  > 0 is a small parameter.
B. Upper bound on steganographic rate
We are now in a position to put a bound on the num-
ber of qubits M that can be sent reliably and stegano-
graphically from Alice to Bob. First we define σE =
N⊗Np+δp(V ρcV †) and apply the Fannes-Audeneart inequal-
ity [21] to the secrecy condition in Eq. (16):
H
(N⊗Np (TrR[ωA′nR])) ≤ H(σE) + g(N, δ) (18)
where g(N, δ) ≡ δN + h2(δ), and h2(·) is the binary en-
tropy function. Also, from the recoverability condition
we have
M = log |A1| = I(R〉B1)ΦB1R
≤ I(R〉B1)Dk(N⊗Np (ωk)) + N + (1 + )h2(/[1 + ])
≤ I(R〉A′n)N⊗Np (ωk) + f(N, )
= H
(N⊗Np (TrR[ωk,A′nR]))
−H(N⊗Np ⊗ IR(ωk,A′nR))+ f(N, ), (19)
where f(N, ) ≡ N+(1+)h2(/[1+]). The first equal-
ity follows from the fact that the coherent information of
a maximally entangled state is just the logarithm of the
dimension of one of the subsystems. The first inequality
follows from the Alicki-Fannes-Audeneart inequality [22]
applied to the recoverability condition given in Eq. (17).
The second inequality is a quantum data processing in-
equality [18]. The last equality follows from the definition
of the coherent information.
Furthermore, using the concavity of the von Neumann
entropy and linearity of quantum operations we have that
min
k∈K
H
(N⊗Np (TrR[ωk,A′nR]))
≤
∑
k
pkH
(N⊗Np (TrR[ωk,A′nR]))
≤ H(N⊗Np (TrR[∑
k
pkωk,A′nR])
)
= H
(N⊗Np (TrR[ωA′nR])), (20)
and for many cases we expect H(N⊗Np (TrR[ωk,A′nR]))
to be roughly the same for every k (see Sec. III C 1 and
III C 2). Thus
H
(N⊗Np (TrR[ωk,A′nR])) ≤ H(N⊗Np (TrR[ωA′nR])) (21)
for all k. Now putting Eq. (18), (19), and (21) together
we arrive at our main result for this section, which states
that Alice can secretly and reliably send M stego qubits
to Bob, where M is bounded above by
M ≤ H(σE)
−H((N⊗Np ⊗ IR)(ωk,A′nR))+ g(N, δ) + f(N, ).
(22)
Thus, if we can compute a maximum for H(σE) =
H(N⊗Np+δp(ρ)) where ρ is pure (because V is an isomet-
ric encoding and ρc is pure), and also compute a lower
bound for H
(
(N⊗Np ⊗ IR)(ωk,A′nR)
)
(or compute it ex-
plictly, recalling that ωk,A′nR is a pure state), then we
have a tight upper bound on the number of qubits M
that can be sent steganographically over a noisy quan-
tum channel Np.
C. Upper bounds for specific channels
For the channels discussed in the achievability sec-
tion of this paper, we can now apply our result given
in Eq. (22), where we make the implicit assumption that
Alice is using a nondegenerate code. Though our result
given by Eq. (22) is true in general, for a degenerate code
the number of distinct error syndromes is smaller (de-
pending on the code), and the bounds discussed here and
achievable rates discussed in the previous section would
be adjusted.
61. The bit flip channel
For the bit flip channel with parameter p+δp given by
Eq. (1), the maximum of H((NBFp+δp)⊗N (ρ)) over all N -
qubit pure states ρ is Nh(p+δp) where h(p+δp) = −(p+
δp) log(p+δp)−(1−(p+δp)) log(1−(p+δp)) is the entropy
of a single qubit sent through this bit flip channel. To
prove this, consider some pure state ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|. Then
(NBFp+δp)⊗N (|ψ〉〈ψ|) =
∑
s
p(s)Xs|ψ〉〈ψ|Xs (23)
where we are summing over all binary strings s of length
N ; Xs is the operator acting on N qubits with an X
acting at every location where s has a 1 and an I where
s has a 0. The probability p(s) is given by
p(s) = pw(s)(1− p)N−w(s), (24)
where w(s) is the weight of string s. The Shannon en-
tropy of this distribution is Nh(p+ δp) since it is a bino-
mial distribution. The von Neumann entropy is the mini-
mum Shannon entropy over all possible ensemble decom-
positions of the given state, and it is not hard to check
that it is achieved when |ψ〉 is a Z eigenstate. Thus we
have computed a maximum for the first term on the right
hand side of Eq. (22).
Now we compute a lower bound for the second term on
the right hand side of Eq. (22) in the case of the bit flip
channel, i.e., H((NBFp )⊗N ⊗ IR)(ωk,A′nR)). First note
that we can write
((NBFp )⊗N ⊗ IR)(ωk,A′nR)
=
∑
i∈T
(Ei ⊗ IR)ωk,A′nR(E†i ⊗ IR)
+
∑
i/∈T
(Ei ⊗ IR)ωk,A′nR(E†i ⊗ IR), (25)
where the index is i = i1i2...iN , the errors Ei are given
by
Ei = Ai1 ⊗ ...⊗AiN , (26)
and T is the set of typical sequences i corresponding to
the typical errors of the channel (NBFp )⊗N [16, 17].
Recall we are making the assumption that the QECC
Alice is using to correct the typical errors of the channel
(NBFp+δp)⊗N is nondegenerate. Because of this, we can
infer that for each k, her encoded state ωk,A′nR forms
a nondegenerate code for the channel (NBFp )⊗N . This
follows from the discussion in Section II A. This means
that on a valid codeword in the QECC, for i ∈ T the
typical errors Ei all have distinct error syndromes, and
act as unitaries that move the code space to a distinct,
orthogonal subspace labeled by i. So an error Ei occurs
with a fixed probability pi for all valid codewords of the
QECC. Recall also that since these errors are typical,
they have almost all the probability, i.e.∑
i∈T
pi = 1−  (27)
for arbitrarily small  > 0 (in the limit of large N). From
Eq. (25) we have that
H
(
((NBFp )⊗N ⊗ IR)(ωk,A′nR)
)
≥ (1− )H( 1
1− 
∑
i∈T
(Ei ⊗ IR)ωk,A′nR(E†i ⊗ IR)
)
+ H
(1

∑
i/∈T
(Ei ⊗ IR)ωk,A′nR(E†i ⊗ IR)
)
≥ (1− )H( 1
1− 
∑
i∈T
(Ei ⊗ IR)ωk,A′nR(E†i ⊗ IR)
)
(28)
where the first inequality follows from the concavity of
the von Neumann entropy and Eq. (27) , and the second
inequality follows because the term proportional to  is
positive. Continuing, we have
(1− )H( 1
1− 
∑
i∈T
(Ei ⊗ IR)ωk,A′nR(E†i ⊗ IR)
)
= −
∑
i∈T
pi log
pi
1−  =
∑
i∈T
(
pi log(1− )− pi log pi
)
= (1− ) log(1− )−
∑
i∈T
pi log pi
≥ Nh(p)−O(). (29)
The first equality follows from the definition of the von
Neumann entropy and Eq. (25). The inequality follows
from performing a Taylor expansion on log(1 − ) and
from the fact that for the bit flip channel (NBFp )⊗N :
−
∑
i∈T
pi log pi ≈ −
∑
i∈T
2−Nh(p) log 2−Nh(p)
= Nh(p)
∑
i∈T
2−Nh(p)
≈ Nh(p)2Nh(p)2−Nh(p) = Nh(p), (30)
where the approximate equalities follow directly from the
theory of typical sequences. Thus
H
(
((NBFp )⊗N ⊗ IR)(ωk,A′nR)
) ≥ Nh(p)−O(), (31)
and combining this with the upper bound we computed
for the first term in Eq. (22) gives
M ≤ N(h(p+ δp)− h(p)) (32)
for a sufficiently reliable and secret protocol and large
enough block size N . Comparing this to Eq. (5), we have
that the encoding described in the previous section for
steganography over the channel NBFp where Eve expects
the channel to be NBFp+δp is essentially optimal.
2. The depolarizing channel
Unfortunately, for the depolarizing channel NDC we
do not know what N -qubit pure state ρ maximizes
7H((NDCp+δp)⊗N (ρ)). However, we can still bound this
quantity, i.e., give an upper bound on the first term in
Eq. (22). Consider the action of this channel on an N
qubit pure state as follows:
(NDCp+δp)⊗N (ρ) ≈
∑
j
EjρE
†
j (33)
where {Ej} is the set of typical errors associated with N
applications of the channel (NDCp+δp)⊗N . Recall that we
are choosing our isometric encoding to correct for typical
errors of the channel Eve beleives to be connecting Alice
and Bob, i.e. NDCp+δp. Furthermore, we’re assuming that
our code is nondegenerate. Therefore the states EjρE
†
j
are all orthogonal to each other for ρ in the codespace,
and Tr[EjρE
†
j ] = pj where pj are the typical probabil-
ities associated with the errors Ej . The von Neumann
entropy is the Shannon entropy minimized over all possi-
ble decompositions, so the entropy of this state is clearly
H(σE) = H((NDCp+δp)⊗N (V ρcV †))
≤ −
∑
j
pj log(pj)
= −
∑
j
2−Ns(p) log 2−Ns(p)
≈ Ns(p)2Ns(p)2−Ns(p) = Ns(p) (34)
In a similar argument to the one given in Sec. III C 1 ,
we can give a lower bound for the second term on the
right hand side of Eq. (22) in the case of the depolarizing
channel. We get that
H(((NDCp )⊗N ⊗ IR)(ωk,A′nR)) ≥ Ns(p)−O(), (35)
where  becomes arbitrarily small for largeN . Combining
this with the upper bound given in Eq. (34) we have that
M ≤ N(s(p+ δp)− s(p)) (36)
for a sufficiently reliable and secret protocol and large
enough block size N . Comparing this to Eq. (11) we have
that the encoding described in the previous section for
steganography over the channel NDCp where Eve expects
the channel to be NDCp+δp is essentially optimal, at least
when we restrict ourselves to nondegenerate codes.
IV. CONCLUSION
Characterizing secret communication over noisy quan-
tum channels is an interesting problem from both a prac-
tical and theoretical perspective. Here we have shown
that two parties are able to communicate secretly with
each other at a nonzero rate over a bit-flip or a depo-
larizing channel Np using a shared secret key, without
arousing suspicion from a potential eavesdropper Eve, so
long as Eve believes the channel to be noisier than it re-
ally is. Eve can be made to believe this through Alice
and Bob systematically adding extra noise to the chan-
nel prior to secret communication. In this paper we gave
explicit bounds on the number of stego qubits that Al-
ice can send to Bob by hiding her secret message in the
syndromes of a nondegenerate error-correcting code de-
signed to correct the typical errors of the channel Eve
believes: Np+δp. We also gave explicit encodings that
achieve these bounds.
Interesting future work should include a generalization
of these results to steganography over general quantum
channels N . It is possible that in order to achieve the
maximum possible rates in this scenario that degener-
ate codes are needed. For example, it is likely that the
steganographic capacity we calculated for the depolar-
izing channel in this paper could be improved in this
way. It is also possible that coding across multiple code-
blocks using degenerate quantum codes could increase
the steganographic capacity.
If the actual physical channel shared between Alice
and Bob is N , and the channel Eve believes is M, then
what is the quantum steganographic capacity? In this
paper we proved that for the bit-flip channel, the rate
is the difference of quantum capacities, i.e., Q(NBFp ) −
Q(NBFp+δp) = N(1−h(p)−1+h(p+δp)) = N(h(p+δp)−
h(p)). Also, allowing for our restriction to nondegenerate
codes, this is true for the depolarizing channel as well.
We conjecture that one might be able to prove that the
steganographic rate in general will be Q(N ) − Q(M).
This will require proof methods that go beyond those of
the current paper, but we believe that this wll be an area
of fruitful future study.
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